17Evidence B

Using broad-market index funds instead of actively managed funds as a long-term core holding (the portion of money you keep invested for years)

The group of stocks purchased collectively by active funds in the United States is already very close to the entire market. However, the extra management fee they charge is a real deduction from the returns you receive. When repeatedly recalculating and comparing fund performance as if it were luck, there are very few funds that can earn back the fees they charge through that extra profit.

Cost

There is no direct monetary cost. The trade-off is that yo…

Benefit

Collectively, U.S. actively managed equity funds hold a portfolio very similar to the broader market. However,…

Cost

There is no direct monetary cost. The trade-off is that you give up the chance of picking a “star fund manager.” The harder part is that when the index drops, you must endure those losses too — you can’t simply sell out midway.

Benefit

Collectively, U.S. actively managed equity funds hold a portfolio very similar to the broader market. However, their high management costs directly translate into lower net returns for investors after fees are deducted. This research used a bootstrap simulation method to repeatedly shuffle fund performance data and gauge how much could be attributed to luck alone. The results show that only a tiny fraction of funds achieve excess returns large enough to cover their fees (U.S., published 2010). S&P Dow Jones Indices conducts an annual review: in 2024, 65% of U.S. actively managed large-cap equity funds underperformed the S&P 500. Over a 24-year span, an average of 64% underperformed each year. In the 15 years ending 2024, no single fund category saw a majority of active funds outperforming their respective benchmarks.

Original sources

Fama EF, French KR (2010). Luck versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund Returns. The Journal of Finance 65(5):1915-1947. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01598.x;S&P Dow Jones Indices (2025). SPIVA U.S. Scorecard Year-End 2024. https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/spiva/article/spiva-us/(官网拒绝自动抓取,数字按 2025-05-12 的存档核对:https://web.archive.org/web/20250512071051/https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/spiva/article/spiva-us/);S&P Dow Jones Indices (2025). SPIVA Asia Ex-Japan Scorecard Mid-Year 2025(Report 1a,China Large-Cap 对 S&P China A 300 的跑输比例:1 年 60.5%、3 年 69.6%、5 年 50.8%). https://web.archive.org/web/20251103165922/https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/documents/spiva/spiva-asia-ex-japan-mid-year-2025.pdf(官网拒绝自动抓取,按存档核对);Harvey CR, Liu Y (2022). Luck versus Skill in the Cross Section of Mutual Fund Returns: Reexamining the Evidence. The Journal of Finance, 77(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13123(争议方)

Open source link
Book note

Controversy: One article has re-examined this conclusion. It points out that the Fama-French method of repeated resampling is insufficient. According to its algorithm, even if the portion of excess returns from a fund is indeed significant, it might still be judged as "indistinguishable from luck." Therefore, the conclusion that "almost no funds possess skill" may be too heavy-handed. The figures in China are not as one-sided as those in the US. According to S&P Dow Jones statistics as of 2025 year 6 month, the proportion of A-share large-cap active funds that underperformed the S&P China A 300 index was 1% in 60.5 year, 3% in 69.6 year, and 5% in 50.8 year. This statistic only goes up to 5 year and cannot provide longer-term data. Therefore, in China, there is no definitive conclusion yet on whether actively managed funds consistently underperform the index in the long run, but the fact that index funds have lower fees remains true. This does not constitute investment advice.

My note